This paper explores the extent to which current reforms of the euro-zone's governance remain encased in the constraints of the Maastricht Treaty -the narrowness of its underlying paradigm; the gaps and imbalances of its design -and the implications for the future of the euro. With a model of 'sound money, sound finances', based on the precepts of German ordo-liberalism, a vulnerability was exposed: it lacked the instruments, not only to aid, but also to police. This was exacerbated by the shallowness of public legitimation, ignored from the outset. The uncertainty, delays and division displayed by the euro-zone's response to the crisis owed much to the 'lock-in' of Maastricht. The paper includes a critical reassessment of Dyson and Featherstone (1999) .
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Introduction
The governance of the euro-zone undoubtedly faces its biggest challenge in the context of the on-going debt crisis. At its heart is the strategic issue of how to manage a heterogeneous group of economies and states. This involves rule-setting and compliance, but it also raises a more complex agenda of cross-national solidarity and the ability of European Union institutions to intercede domestically to steer and uphold necessary adjustments. Indeed, the two bailouts for Greece in 2010-2012 questioned the ability of the EU to micro-manage domestic structural reform. Much attention has been paid to the crisis by economists, but these are issues which are very much in the territory of political science. The aim of this paper is to establish how current reform efforts remain encased in the constraints of the Maastricht Treaty -the narrowness of its underlying paradigm; and, the gaps and imbalances of its design -and the implications for the future of the euro. In essence, the questions come down to matters of foresight and policy learning, as well as of path dependency and lock-in.
The Maastricht constraint has reinforced the EU's tendency to economic orthodoxy in other cases. .As Lütz and Kranke (2010: 15) observed, in their study of Hungary, Latvia and Romania, 'the EU's recent lending policies amount to a European rescue of the Washington Consensus. While the IMF has-at least in part-relaxed its formerly tight stance on economic conditionality attached to its loans, the EU has actively promoted orthodox measures in return for loans to those countries that are designated to join the single currency area and hence have to meet certain economic criteria'.
The importance of the euro to the EU means that there are wider implications drawn from the effectiveness and nature of its policies and governance. The confrontation in Greece between the reforms encouraged by the 'Troika' and the domestic resistance to the costs of austerity poses unprecedented questions about European integration -its norms, processes and purposesand its reliance on a foundation of popular legitimacy. 'Europe', previously synonymous with modernisation, progress and economic gains, was now associated with a level of austerity not known in recent peace-time. At the same time, the EU was being drawn into a process of monitoring, supervision and conditionality -penetrating the domestic state administration via a seemingly permanent 'Troika' office in Athens -that risked clashes of cultural frames and of acceptability. From a starting-point of limiting euro-zone level domestic intervention in the name of governments building their own stability cultures, 'Europe' had been dragged into a highly fraught political contest, questioning its ability to manage the process.
The agenda advanced by the Troika in the context of the bailouts owes much to previous IMF actions in states in crisis, but it also shows the extent to which the euro-zone remains 'locked-in' to the normative underpinnings of the Maastricht Treaty agreed in December 1991. In order to establish this constraint and its current implications, this paper will:
• Clarify the notions of path dependency and 'lock-in' to be applied here;
• Re-examine the expectations and assumptions prevalent in the Maastricht negotiations -with some critical self-reflection on the account given in Dyson and Featherstone (1999) .
• Consider the fragility of the Maastricht construct in the context of the limits of any parallel political integration.
• Outline the failure to escape from the Maastricht principles as the eurocrisis took hold in 2010-11.
• Assess the implications for the immediate future of the euro-zone.
Bargaining, lock-in and inefficiency
In a basic sense a treaty like that of Maastricht is intended to create enduring commitments, to tie the signatories in to a set of rules and mutual obligations.
But the claim developed here goes further.
Path dependency can be a glib reference and it needs careful application (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995; Pierson: 2000) . In its strongest form, path dependence (in historical institutionalism) contradicts the neo-classical economic model of consistently rational behaviour leading to efficient and predictable outcomes. At issue, is the extent to which errors were made at the point of the original agreement and how far these were knowable and avoidable. This is what Liebowitz and Margolis, in their severe (rationalist) challenge to the field, refer to as 'Third-degree path dependence'. Thus, it is not merely that the original decision appears inefficient in retrospect -their 'Second-degree path dependence' -but that at the initial point there were alternatives and the knowledge to avoid a regrettable outcome. They judge the likelihood of such conditions existing to be very low. But, as Pierson (2000: 256-7) points out, politics differs from economics: there is even less reason to assume anything like a market mechanism will be self-correcting and the institutional setting matters.
The 'Third-degree path dependence' is a bold proposition: the study of bargaining processes, like that leading to Maastricht, can assume voluntary decisions by 'utlity-maximisers' (the assumptions of rational choice). The frame of historical institutionalism, however -and the interpretation of preMaastricht bargaining offered in Dyson and Featherstone (1999) -emphasises the structuring of choices and decisions over time, with distinctive 'paths' of rationality that may be sub-optimal for some negotiating parties and for the collective outcome. Learning itself is path dependent: an actor's understandings are filtered by existing mental maps (Pierson, 2000; Thelen, 1999) .
For some writers, path dependence is predicated on 'increasing returns' or positive feedback processes over time, though others are not so restrictive.
The notion refers to how the costs of switching from one alternative path to another will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over time. In the case of EMU, a resistance to change can be readily identified over the last decade. This may be attributed to a set of policy beliefs being sustained over time that gave primacy to monetary stability, a desire to build-up the credibility of the original Treaty provisions, and recognition that a shift would impose disproportionate costs on the pivotal partner, Germany. The latter was and is clearly crucial to the maintenance of the system and was also the progenitor of the principles underpinning the original design. Even when a systemic shock occurred in 2009-10, with the Greek debt crisis, the steer remained tied to the original course. So, what exactly was being 'locked-in' (Arthur, 1989) after Maastricht? The following sections will justify a claim of lock-in to a paradigm of 'sound money, sound finances' and one based on an ordo-liberal belief of responsibility being held at the level of national governments. This same paradigm curtailed the options considered for reform of euro-zone provisions in response to the systemic shock. Indeed, it served to re-define the content of 'economic governance when the notion reappeared in political debate. In sum, the prime discourse remained one of penalties and tightened regulation for governments not abiding by the rules set by Maastricht -to better overcome the 'moral hazard' they posed to the original construct -rather than a return to the Keynesian-inspired ideas of the Werner Report on EMU of 1970, for example.
The 'lock-in' of Maastricht For Keynesians, the Werner Report of 1970 -also concerned with outlining the requirements of EMU -appeared intellectually superior to the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty 1 . The latter had referred to the need for a 'centre of decision for economic policy', with powers to coordinate fiscal policy and issues of investment and consumption, infrastructure, and policy coordination to address the need for growth and employment. The Report foresaw a fiscal transfer system to provide 'automatic stabilisers' and a coordinated investment programme to help states in difficulty.
In the Inter-Governmental Conference negotiations, the Commission had promoted some Neo-Keynesian ideas: its own paper of May 1990 had advocated that the European Council should formulate 'economic policy guidelines' and Delors himself had shown support for a structure of 'economic governance' at the EU level, though he avoided using the term Be that as it may, references to 'economic governance' shocked the German Finance Ministry and the Bundesbank. Instead, its own dominant paradigm was of 'sound money' and the precepts of Ordo-liberalism. This entailed priority to disinflation; budgetary discipline; and currency stability, underscored by the vital importance of the credibility of policies within the financial markets (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 2 Alongside these shifts was some optimism with respect to the general macroeconomic climate -growth across the EMS had been relatively high for the previous four years -and the 'feel-good' factor promoted a sense of inclusiveness.
There were also institutional sensitivities at play. The failure to address fiscal policy issues prior to Maastricht was, in part, the result of an unwillingness to cede political autonomy over such matters to the EU level. The risks inherent in an heterogeneous monetary union were to be left for adjustment at the national level. Ordo-liberalism advocated that a stability culture -matching sound money with sound finances -could only be developed 'bottom-up' -that is, from the domestic level -and it could not be imported from outside or 'faked'. It might also be added that the convergence criteria for entry into the 'euro' could serve as a means of importing discipline from outside for reform advocates at the domestic level (Carli, 1993) . Thus, there were philosophical reasons to deny competence for fiscal management at the EU level.
In the years after Maastricht, conditions changed but the policy regime, with very minor exceptions, did not. The Italian economic performance looked promising and the government of Constantine Mitsotakis in Greece was embarked on a dash for qualification, based on an over-confidence in the speed of domestic adjustment. The Maastricht negotiators had -in the mainnot expected all member states to join the convoy of euro-entrants at the outset, but the political imperative ebbed. When it came to judging whether the entry conditions had been met, there was a shared interest in fudging or massaging the tests. In particular, debt levels above the required 60% of GDP were set aside.
Thus, the Maastricht Treaty had bequeathed:
• A rejection of EU institutional competence not only to coordinate and set economic policy for the euro-area, but also to delve, police and adequately punish national governments deviating from the convergence rules. The 'moral hazard' of governments manipulating the data and of sustaining uncompetitive paths was not addressed
properly.
• An expectation that the euro-zone would not be fully inclusive at the outset, but a shift of political interest that made it difficult to block all but Greece -and her only temporarily.
• An assumption that heterogeneity and asymmetric shocks could be handled by the disciplinary power of the financial markets, strengthened by the rules on no bailouts (Art.125) and the 'excessive deficit procedure' (Art. 104) for lax national governments.
• A belief that matters of demand management did not belong to the EU level and, given the failures of Keynesianism, national governments were best served by priority to monetary stability (sound money) as the necessary policy regime for growth in the long-term.
The Maastricht provisions comprised contradictions and gaps. On the one hand, the strictures were of no bail-outs, the importance of abiding by the rules, and sanctions for those that do not. Solidarity was to be created by the imposition of penalties, though the democratic underpinnings of EMU governance were minimal. There would be no facility to expel errant member states nor would the latter have a specified legal right of exit. When faced with a deep economic crisis -inevitably eliciting strong political and social reactions -what would happen with states unable to deliver compliance?
Immediately after Maastricht the disciplinary rules were already appearing unenforceable (Buiter et al, 1993: 58, 90 ).
In Dyson and Featherstone (1999) , we charted the ideational, institutional, and strategic underpinnings of the 'road' to Maastricht. Inevitably, in trying to examine the negotiations from the 'inside', there was a risk of absorbing the instinctive assumptions of the key actors involved. Thus, in the light of the recent debt crisis, we were not explicit enough in accounting for the progress of the 'no bail out' rule. We considered it in the context of preferenceformation in different national contexts -especially Germany -but it seemed so inevitable and essentially uncontested that we chose not to highlight it as a theme in the index. Perhaps more acutely, we gave insufficient attention in our conclusions -as, indeed, had the negotiators themselves -to the implications of the heterogeneity of national politics and administrative systems with respect to the ability to abide by the rules set. The issue was one of a different kind of asymmetric 'shock': the incapacity to implement reforms and accept fiscal rules consistent with the Treaty. In a sense, the neglect was strange: how could negotiators not be sensitive to the risks of striking deals with politicians like Guilo Andreotti, Prime Minister of Italy, for example -an embodiment of a 'partitocrazia' known for its fiscal laxity? Other member states had sustained high debt to GDP ratios for a long period: Greece and Belgium, being two such instances. How could they be expected to deliver 'sound finances'?
The answer we gave was that these limitations accrued from the Maastricht negotiations being set as a politically-isolated, narrow 'core executive' activity (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 746-7) . A 'technically rational outcome on EMU' had been negotiated 'free from the complexities of political-union negotiations' leaving 'some critical gaps ' (1999:747) . We did not specify the problem of divergent system capabilities, norms or logics as one such gap.
Instead, we highlighted the political exposure of the ECB -without a location within a political union framework -and a 'potentially highly problematic relationship between rulers and ruled ' (1999: 747) . Both were relevant to the subsequent history of EMU, but were incomplete as an account of the political risks.
More generally, the Maastricht set of rules, the philosophy and its
assumptions would be very severely tested by the unprecedented growth of capital mobility over the euro's first decade. In fairness, the international economy had changed since the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992: 'credit default swaps' had then been unknown, the credit rating agencies had barely entered the European market 2 , and sub-prime mortgages were not on the radar screen. No-one foresaw the collapse of major Wall Street institutions like Lehman Brothers in September 2008 nor the ferocity of the gathering credit crunch. Thus, the euro's own failing regime and the wider structural changes in the international capital markets served to create a combustible set of conditions.
The Limits of Political Integration
The Maastricht agreement on EMU was left vulnerable by the absence of economic governance, but also by the risks with respect to cross-national solidarity. It was clear that, 'The fundamental point remained that the German model failed to offer an adequate basis for a sustainable EMU', a 'new sense of solidarity that would support 'burden-sharing' within EMU' was likely to prove elusive, as 'EMU's Achilles' heel was the prospect of people being asked to make sacrifices for others with whom there was a weak sense of identity' (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 796) . Even in the EMU negotiations, German representatives had displayed, 'a deep-seated mistrust that began with the Greeks and ranged through Italy, Spain, and Belgium to include France' (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 372) .
Moreover, well before the credit crunch and the debt crisis, the surveys of While some 60% equated Europe with 'peace' -something of an historical reference point -the absence of solidaristic attitudes of relevance to current issues was not a strong base on which to face asymmetric economic shocks as
Europe was soon to face.
The survey results were consistent with a number of academic studies exploring the roots and contours of European identity. In his study of public attitudes, Fligstein (2008) saw Europe as a transnational society, but one that was shallow. The extent and depth of cross-national interaction was limited to a minority. He identified a variation across three social groups. The most pro-European were the young, the educated, the professional, and the business sections of the electorate. The most fearful of Europe tended to be the older, poorer, and less-educated voters. In-between was a middle class 'swing' constituency, which sometimes saw itself as being 'European'. Unlike national identity, Europe lacked a cross-class attachment or appeal (see also Bruter, 2003) . Again, the picture painted suggests vulnerability for the European project at a time of economic crisis. "In less than two weeks, a 9 billion-euro bond comes due and the state coffers don't have this money…As we speak today the country can't borrow it from foreign markets and the only way to avoid bankruptcy and a halt on payments is to get this money from our European partners and the IMF." [5.5.10]
A game of brinkmanship was evident: the Greek government needed to give signals to both its domestic audience, but also to its euro-zone partners. Even then, the final chapter in the first rescue had not been closed: it took a further nine days before EU finance ministers sanctioned the loan. The package was set at €110bn with strict conditions. The uncertainty and delay in the EU acting undoubtedly had driven up the 'ante' needed to have credibility to convince the international financial markets that the euro-zone would stand by one of its members.
Chancellor Merkel in Germany had felt under much domestic pressure to be tough on Greece. In the first months of 2010 she had waited for difficult state elections in North-Rhine Westphalia to be completed. She also had to take account of the German Constitutional Court's previous decisions on the legal conditions under which the Deutschemark had been abandoned for the euro which stressed the need for the new currency to be based on stable, Crucially, it experienced a shortfall in the tax revenue it was raising and the Troika warned it might not be able to sanction the next loan instalment. The tensions in the euro-zone were spreading to other states: the fear of contagion was prominent. By July 2011, EU leaders had faced the inevitable and had agreed that a second Greek bailout would be needed. The new loan was set at €109 billion, it would come with a lower interest repayment rate and a longer period in which to pay it back (fifteen years).
Merkel insisted that there should be a new element in this loan: the banks that had lent recklessly to Greece should suffer a hit. 'Private sector involvement' (PSI) would mean they took a 'haircut', forced to accept they would get less of their money back. At the same time, EU leaders agreed that the 'European Financial Stability Fund' (EFSF) they had sanctioned the year before with some €750 billion of funding would be superseded by a larger 'European Stability Mechanism' (ESM), with a greater leeway in how it could be utilised.
The funds -and their increase -were a recognition that the problems of the euro-zone were no longer confined to Greece and that a bigger war chest was needed to assure the survival of the euro in the face of the market onslaught.
Bailouts had earlier been agreed for Ireland (November 2010) and Portugal (May 2011).
But the July agreement began to unravel over the summer. Finland led an initiative to insist that the Greek government should provide collateral for the new loans, the Slovakian Parliament seemed that it might not agree the second bailout, and the political climate in Austria was also very antagonistic.
The political clashes and uncertainty increased the speculation on a Greek default. The Commission denied it was preparing for such an eventuality, though German ministers said it could not be ruled out. By October 2011, the EU had edged further towards a second rescue deal but it awaited further assurances from Greece. A European Council meeting scheduled for midOctober was put back by a week. When it met on 23 October, a package for
Greece involving a €100bn-euro loan, a 50% (PSI) debt write-off, and more austerity measures in Greece was negotiated. Military expenditures -and the potential to buy hardware from France and Germany -was, by contrast, not to be cut. This aside, it was clear that the second bailout was to be underscored by stronger pressure on, and monitoring of, Greece. There was rescue-fatigue on the part of Greece's partners.
Altogether, the 2012 package constituted the biggest sovereign debt restructuring in history. The Commission's own estimates of the support given to Greece put it at some €380 billion, equal to 177% of the Greek GDP, or €33.600 for each Greek inhabitant (Euractiv, 18.4.12) . The sum included loans, write-downs on loans and EU funds delivered to Greece since the beginning of the debt crisis. The Commission compared this to the Marshall Plan after 1947 which had involved transfers equal to around 2.1% of the GDP of recipient countries. This was somewhat disingenuous as the economic conditions between the two periods were very different, as were the impacts of the Greek austerity measures. The two bailouts resolved Greece's immediate financing needs, but the first and even the second were very unlikely in themselves to revive the domestic economy, which had already been in recession for five consecutive years.
The sovereign debt crises in Greece, Ireland and Portugal -and fears of them spreading to Italy and Spain, which soon proved valid -provoked a new debate on euro-zone governance. Not only had the EMU set-up been found wanting, its institutions had also been obliged to act in ways other than the expected manner. The bailouts themselves had been crafted in a way so as to circumvent the Treaty commitments: it was euro-zone governments, not the EU or the ECB that contributed the two-thirds funding alongside the IMF. At the same time, the European Central Bank had been forced to innovate in its support for governments and the banking systems. The ECB had been established to be even more independent than the Bundesbank, but now its actions seemed to some to be more comprising politically and to be leaning towards the monetisation of deficits.
A patchwork quilt of measures was initiated. The ESM was close to Sarkozy's preference for a European Monetary Fund. The ESM would be able to help euro-zone states before they needed long-term aid and would be able to The Pact sought to sanctify the debt and deficit rules. The relevant extracts are given in Fig. 1 . Art. 3(ii) committed member states to put into their national laws or constitutions that such provisions be an obligation and that a 'correction mechanism' for deviations be established. Art. 4 made it a requirement that national debt be kept within 60% of GDP. Art. 8(ii) allowed for one government to challenge the fiscal position of another before the Court and the latter could impose a lump sum payment or fine. The closer economic coordination of Art. 11 was designated as a shared learning process, but it also posed a common constraint on the options available. the rule under point (a) shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific mediumterm objective, as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, with a lower limit of a structural deficit of 0,5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective medium-term objective. The time-frame for such convergence will be proposed by the European Commission taking into consideration countryspecific sustainability risks. Progress towards, and respect of, the medium-term objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the revised Stability and Growth Pact. Art. 8(ii) provided for penalties and fines: Where, on the basis of its own assessment or that of the European Commission, a Contracting Party considers that another Contracting Party has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 1, it may bring the case before the Court of Justice and request the imposition of financial sanctions following criteria established by the European Commission in the framework of Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. If the Court of Justice finds that the Contracting Party concerned has not complied with its judgment, it may impose on it a lump sum or a penalty payment appropriate in the circumstances and that shall not exceed 0,1 % of its gross domestic product. The amounts imposed on a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro shall be payable to the European Stability Mechanism. Art. 11 provided for closer economic policy coordination: the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. Such coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as required by European Union law.
More radical reforms did not appear on the negotiating table in the on-going European debate. A number of economists argued for the creation of common euro-bonds, to share the debt and bolster its financing with the credibility of the stronger economies. To criticisms that this would not help with 'moral hazard' problems, the Bruegel think tank in Brussels proposed two types of euro-bonds -one for those governments with debt above 60% of their GDP, the other for those with lower debts. Sharing national debts, however, 
Conclusions
It is evident that the model of governance established for EMU in the Maastricht Treaty rested on a paradigm of 'sound money, sound finances' with its origins in German ordo-liberalism. From that base, the model became vulnerable in the face of a crisis: it lacked the instruments and capability of economic governance -to police, but also to aid. This risk was exacerbated by the shallowness of public legitimation -seen in attitudes towards solidarity, trust, tolerance -that would be needed if re-balancing actions were to be taken. The EU's response to the emergence of the euro-crisis -its uncertainty, division and delays -showed the extent to which it remained locked-in to the Maastricht frame. Even the new Fiscal Pact remains consistent with those provisions, recalibrating and toughening-up the rules.
There is a new rhetoric of 'economic governance' -redefined since 1990 -and a mechanism by which governments should consult their partners, ex ante, on any domestic reform initiatives, but this is a provision free of budget transfers and simply facilitates mutual surveillance. The euro-zone is not breaking-free of the Maastricht legacy.
A path dependence akin to what Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) termed 'Third Degree' is evident: at the initial point of decision: alternatives were rejected (due to Germany's lead) that were accepted as more efficient by others (France, in particular) and the outcome proved sub-optimal for all, especially as the set course was maintained for too long in the light of the new conditions, increasing the adjustment costs.
The path risks an iteration of financial crises -in debt exposure and banking system viability -as 'rescued' states are left on a path of austerity and a slow return to growth. Few expect the second Greek bailout to prevent a further re-structuring crisis.
The issues of governance and of solidarity remain to be addressed. The eurozone has to deal with the risks of heterogeneity, not only of economic performance but of political system: of the weaknesses of domestic state administrations to oversee reform, of social dissensus blocking reform agendas. The euro-zone is now committed to a long-term domestic oversight function in Athens: its capabilities are being stretched like never before.
